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OUTSOURCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA: 
EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND CONTRACTING IN THE  
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
 





 Changes to the Indian economy in the 1980s and 1990s paved 
the way for U.S. companies to use lower-cost Indian labor, 
especially in the information technology (IT) sector. Over the past 
decade, U.S. software companies have increased their use of lower-
cost Indian software developers. However, U.S. companies have 
not organized their use of the Indian software developers in a way 
consistent with prevailing foreign direct investment (FDI) theories 
of researchers like Williamson, Wells, and Huang. This paper will 
provide background on the Indian economy and FDI theories and 
refine previous FDI theory to recognize how U.S. companies are 
actually making use of lower-cost Indian labor force. 
 Part II will provide background on India’s economic reform and 
the role of Indian software workers on the IT boom in the U.S. in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. It also will discuss the current level 
of outsourcing to India in the software industry. Part III will 
examine the FDI theories, which predict that U.S. firms should 
utilize the lower-cost Indian IT labor. Part IV will provide evidence 
that U.S. software companies use the lower-cost Indian labor in a 
manner different from that predicted by prevalent FDI theories. 
This part will also attempt to explain actual investment patterns. 
Finally, Part V will propose a follow-up study to investigate the 
patterns of U.S. software outsourcing. 
 
 
 * Michael J. Meehan is a J.D. candidate at Stanford University (2007). He was a 
visiting research scholar at Stanford University (2001−04). He received a Ph.D. in 
Computer Science from the University of North Carolina (2001), where he also 
received his M.S. in Computer Science (1997). Additionally, he earned his B.S.E. in 
Computer Engineering from Purdue University (1994). 





A. The Indian Economy 
 
 Prior to economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, a 
bureaucratic system often called the “License Raj” controlled the 
Indian economy.1 The system employed centralized government 
decision-making bodies to control companies’ entry into particular 
market sectors.2 The Indian government instituted the system 
because it believed that centralized control of the market would 
better protect the Indian economy from domination by foreign 
actors.3 The system regulated domestic and foreign entry into 
industrial sectors, controlled diversification of companies, and 
determined the allocation of resources and government 
investments.4 As a result, once the government licensed a company 
to operate in a certain sector, it was relatively free from market 
competition.5 This system led to corruption and stifled the Indian 
economy; during that time India’s economic growth rate stood at a 
less than four percent in terms of gross domestic product (GDP).6 
 In the 1980s, the government of Rajiv Gandhi made minor 
reforms to “encourage capital-goods imports, relax industrial 
regulations, and rationalize the tax system.”7 Reforms continued in 
1991, where the Indian government engaged in reducing the 
number of industry sectors covered by government licensing 
schemes, simplifying the procedural rules and regulations 
governing industry, opening previously public-only market sectors 
 
 
 1 Ilyana Kuziemko & Geoffrey Rapp, India's Wayward Children: Do Affirmative 
Action Laws Designed to Compensate India's Historically Disadvantaged Castes 
Explain Low Foreign Direct Investment by the Indian Diaspora?, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 323, 347 (2001). 
 2 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49–51 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1993). 
 3 Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: 
India, 83 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1609 (1997). 
 4 BHAGWATI, supra note 2, at 49–51. 
 5 Kuziemko & Rapp, supra note 1, at 347. 
 6 J. Bradford DeLong, India Since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative, 
MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ANALYTICAL COUNTRY STUDIES 3 (Dani Rodrik ed., 
2001), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Growth%20volume/DeLong-
India.pdf. 
 7 Dani Rodrik, Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep 
Determinants of Economic Growth, MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ANALYTICAL 
COUNTRY STUDIES 19 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2002).  
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to private actors, reducing funding for selected public sector 
undertakings, and liberalizing foreign direct investment, trade, and 
exchange rate policies.8  
 Under the partially relaxed government controls of the 1980s, 
the Indian economy grew at a rate just under six percent per year.9 
Following the 1991 reforms, the annual growth in Indian GDP 
continued at six percent.10 Some researchers, including Rodrick and 
DeLong, view these early reforms as the springboard for India’s 
long-term economic growth, not only providing legal reforms, but 
also initiating a change in attitude towards relaxed government 
regulation.11 On the other hand, Panagariya, an Indian economics 
professor, believes that expanded borrowing in the 1980s produced 
India’s initial economic boom and that substantive reforms in the 
1990s sustained the initial boom.12 Regardless of the exact reasons, 
thirty-five years of sustained economic growth provides persuasive 
empirical evidence that the reforms in India enabled changes in its 
economy that opened the door for both domestic production and 
foreign investment.13  
 The 1991 reforms also included increased protection of 
intellectual property (IP). While IP laws are considered stronger in 
India than in China and other developing countries, they are not 
typically considered as strong as IP laws in the U.S.14 Starting in 
1994, Indian copyright law provided copyright protection for 
computer programs.15 From 2002 to 2005, however, India 
completely excluded computer programs from patent protection.16 
As of January 1, 2005, the legislators relaxed those restrictions to 
comply with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-
 
 
 8 MINISTRY OF FIN., GOV'T OF INDIA, THE ECONOMY SURVEY OF INDIA, ch. 7 
(1997). 
 9 DeLong, supra note 6, at 3. 
 10 Sophi Beach, The Tiger in Front: India and China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2005, 
available at  http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3689214.  
 11 Rodrik, supra note 7, at 19; Delong, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
 12 Arvind Panagariya, India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms  4–7 
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/04/4, 2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0443.pdf. 
 13 Panagariya provides evidence of increased foreign investment in India since 
1990. Id. at 34. 
 14 Nathan E. Stacy, Comment, The Efficacy and Fairness of Current Sanctions in 
Effecting Stronger Patent Rights in Developing Countries, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
263, 294–95 (2004). 
 15 The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1994. 
 16 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002. 
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Specifically, India 
now excludes only “a computer programme per se other than its 
technical application to industry or a combination with hardware.”17 
While this is not as broad as software patent protection in the U.S., 
which does not provide additional patentability restrictions on 
software,18 the 2005 changes did provide increased patent 
protection for software. However, as noted by Professor Agarwal of 
the Indian Institute of Management, India may need years to 
develop the expertise in its patent office and in its courts before the 
public can safely predict what is and is not patentable software.19 
 
B. Indian IT Workers 
 
 During the worldwide IT boom that started in the mid-1990s, 
thousands of talented Indians immigrated to the U.S. to take up 
positions in the software industry. For example, in 2002, 47,000 
(sixty-three percent) out of the 74,000 nonimmigrant temporary 
workers obtaining H-1B visas to work in the computer-related 
industries were from India. In fact, the U.S. provided more than 
four times as many H-1B visas to workers from India than to 
workers from China and Europe combined.20 The two previous 
years reflect similar percentages—sixty-eight percent in 2000 and 
seventy-one percent in 2001.21 The National Science Foundation 
found in a recent survey that approximately one in four 
mathematicians and computer scientists are foreign born.22 The 
 
 
 17 The Patents Bill, 2005, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 2005.  
 18 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that software programs are not excludable from patent 
protection per se). See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 19 Anurag K. Agarwal, Software Patent, BUS. COGNIZANCE, Jan.-Feb. 2005, 
http://mba.iiita.ac.in/janfeb05/brainwave_software.htm. 
 20 H-1B visas allow non-U.S. citizens to enter the United States to work in their 
field of specialization for three to six years. In 2002, the 47,000 software and 
computer-related workers from India represented seventy-three percent of the total 
specialized H-1B nonimmigrants from India in all specializations. Other 
specializations of note were “architecture, engineering, and surveying” at nine percent 
and “medicine and health” at four percent. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 152 (2003), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2002/Yearbook2002.pdf. 
 21 U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 192 (2002), available at http://uscis.gov/ 
graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2001/yearbook2001.pdf. 
 22 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCI. & ENG'G INDICATORS, O-13 (2004), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/pdf/overview.pdf. 
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survey did not specify in what country the computer scientists were 
born, but related data for H-1B visas suggest that significant 
percentages were born in India. 
 The growing presence of people of Indian descent in the 
computer industry may have laid the foundation for the recent 
increase of software outsourcing to India. In fact, some of the 
Indian software workers have started their own software 
outsourcing companies. These workers, in particular, provide 
networks of previous colleagues and clients that augment their 
outsourcing companies.23 While there is no empirical data on the 
subject, it is possible that Indian-trained workers enhanced 
confidence in the Indian software contracting industry with their 
high quality work and high productivity levels.  
 
C. Outsourcing to India 
 
 Companies are outsourcing a significant amount of computer-
related work to India. A recent survey from ITtoolbox found that 
approximately thirty percent of IT companies worldwide outsource 
overseas and that, of those, seventy-four percent outsource to 
India.24The survey also found that companies more often 
outsourced “technical jobs,” such as software development, 
maintenance, and support, than less technical jobs, such as help-
desk support, training, and education.25 As the core of an IT 
company, outsourcing technical jobs may lead to increased risk of 
theft or loss of IP for U.S. firms (discussed at length below).  
 
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT THEORIES 
  
 Researchers like Williamson, Wells, and Huang laid the 
theoretical foundation for determining how firms should choose to 
capitalize on lower-cost foreign labor. These researchers consider 
two alternative business structures: the Contracting Model and the 
Foreign Direct Investment Model (FDI Model). In the Contracting 
 
 
 23 One of the interviewees, whose experience is later related in this paper, is an 
Indian-born entrepreneur. 
 24 ITTOOLBOX, 2004 ITTOOLBOX OUTSOURCING SURVEY (2004), 
http://security.ittoolbox.com/documents/research/dell1_survey.pdf (last visited April 
3, 2006). 
 25 Id. 
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Model, a U.S. software firm26 hires an Indian software contracting 
firm to work on a per-contract basis. Under this scheme, the U.S. 
firm agrees to pay the Indian firm for work performed and the 
Indian firm in turn provides software or related services to the U.S. 
firm. In the FDI Model, the U.S. firm opens a subsidiary in India, 
hiring Indian IT workers to develop software and provide related 
services. In both models, the U.S. firm can reduce its overall 
software development costs by tapping into lower-cost Indian 
workers.  
 In a market without transaction costs or risk, companies will 
employ the Contracting Model in order to capitalize on the lower-
cost Indian software professionals. In such a market, competitive 
bidding allows U.S. firms to capture the lower cost of software 
professionals without substantial overhead from the Indian 
contracting firm. 
 
A. Williamson and Huang 
 
 Williamson identifies two combinations of environmental and 
human factors that render the Contracting Model untenable, 
prompting a firm to adopt FDI Model.27 The first combination 
occurs when the human factor of opportunism combines with the 
environmental factor of small numbers.28 If, for example, a few 
Indian firms begin to dominate a particular market, then the few 
remaining firms may engage in opportunism and escalate prices. 
Assuming that Indian labor remains cheaper than comparable U.S. 
labor, U.S. firms will internalize the lower-cost Indian labor 
through FDI, thereby bypassing the opportunistic Indian 
contracting firms. However, except in situations where an Indian 
software contracting firm holds a monopoly on expertise needed for 
a software project, this combination of factors is unlikely to occur 
in software outsourcing. So far, there has not been a shortage of 




 26 This paper assumes a U.S. software firm throughout. However, most of this 
analysis is generally applicable to non-U.S. firms that are utilizing Indian outsourcing 
for cost savings. In addition, the theories described are applicable to non-Indian 
contracting firms that are able to provide services below the market rate for U.S. 
software development. 
 27 OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 9 (Free Press 1975). 
 28 Id. at 9–10. 
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 Williamson identifies a second combination of environmental 
and human factors that better apply to India’s current situation. 
According to Williamson, a U.S. firm may have incentive to open 
an Indian subsidiary under the FDI Model when environmental 
uncertainty combines with the human factor of bounded rationality. 
29 Bounded rationality occurs when the human mind’s capacity “for 
formulating and solving complex problems is [overwhelmed by] the 
size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior.”30 In the case of cross-border projects discussed 
herein, the environmental uncertainty may include exchange-rate 
risk, expropriation risk, and legal risk, as well as economic and 
market uncertainty. 
 
1. Exchange-rate risk 
 
 The FDI Model and the Contracting Model both present a 
similar exchange-rate risk. Under the Contracting Model, if a 
contract is negotiated in Indian rupees, the U.S. firm will take on 
the risk of the rupee-to-U.S. dollar exchange-rate fluctuation. This 
risk could be substantial, especially for longer-term contracts, 
considering that the U.S. dollar has nearly tripled in value relative 
to the Indian rupee over the last 15 years.31 If the contract is 
negotiated in U.S. dollars, the Indian contracting company may 
build a premium into the contract to account for potential 
exchange-rate fluctuations. Under the FDI Model, if a U.S. firm 
opens an Indian subsidiary, the U.S. firm takes on the exchange-
rate risk of paying employees, taxes, property costs, and incidentals 
in rupees. If a U.S. firm can negotiate a contract in U.S. dollars, it 
may prefer the Contracting Model to the FDI Model in order to pay 
an up-front premium to minimize exchange-rate risk. However, 
given that the premium charged by the Indian contracting firm 
should be at least as high as the expected exchange-rate risk, the 
U.S. firm may be generally better off negotiating the contract in 
rupees or adopting the FDI Model. Consequently, the similarity in 
effect makes exchange-rate risk a less important consideration in 
choosing between the two models. 
 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198 (Taylor & 
Francis 1957) (emphasis removed). 
 31 X-rates.com, Historic Exchange Rates, http://www.x-rates.com/cgi-bin/ 
hlookup.cgi (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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2. Expropriation risk 
 
 India is attempting to reassure potential investors that 
investment in India is safe. In an address to a joint session of the 
U.S. Congress in July of 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh showcased India as a safe destination for foreign investment 
and strongly encouraged U.S. investment in India.32 However, the 
ongoing battle between the Indian government, Bechtel, and 
General Electric in the Dabhol power project attests to the potential 
for expropriation risk in India.33 Vernon and Moran note that 
foreign investors hold considerable leverage over the sovereign 
government; however, when a project spends funds on fixed 
infrastructure in the foreign country, the leverage shifts, and one 
can expect an increased risk of expropriation.34 In regards to the 
Dabhol power project, where over one billion U.S. dollars in 
infrastructure were fixed in India, Vernon and Moran would argue 
that expropriation became possible once the physical infrastructure 
was in place. 
 The obsolescing bargain noted by Vernon and Moran is less 
likely to affect FDI in the software industry. The software industry 
is human capital-intensive, where the ratio of buildings and 
equipment costs, relative to the cost of staff is much lower in the 
software industry than in the energy or manufacturing industries. 
The software industry, rarely, if ever, incurs large infrastructure 
costs. The government would have little incentive to expropriate a 
software subsidiary in order to obtain computers, desks, chairs, and 
an office building or a lease to an office building. Therefore, unlike 
the energy and manufacturing industries, in the software industries 
the FDI Model poses little risk of expropriation. As a result, 
expropriation risk is unlikely to affect a U.S. firm’s choice between 
the FDI Model and the Contracting Model in the software industry. 
 
 
 32 Manmohan Signh, Prime Minister of India, Address at the Joint Session of the 
U.S. Congress (July 19, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.indianembassy.org/ 
press_release/2005/July/23.htm). 
 33 Even though an independent tribunal ruled in favor of Bechtel and General 
Electric as to the expropriation in September of 2003, Bechtel and General Electric 
continued to struggle to regain their investment. See id. 
 34 THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE NEW POLICY 
AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 142–43 (Inst. for 
Int'l Econ. 1998); see also RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE 
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US ENTERPRISES 46–48 (Basic Books 1971). 
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3. Market and economic risk 
  
 Market uncertainty may provide U.S. software companies 
incentive to adopt the FDI Model. Consider the situation where a 
U.S. firm hires an Indian software development team (either 
through FDI or contracting) to expand into an area expected to 
grow—for example, enterprise software. The software will take one 
year to build and test. If, while the firm is still developing the 
software, Microsoft deploys substantially identical enterprise 
software at half the price that the U.S. firm expects to sell its 
product, the U.S. firm may have to terminate its enterprise software 
project. If the firm adopted the FDI Model, it may be able to 
terminate the project and recoup the human capital costs by altering 
the project. If the altered project is sufficiently similar, some of the 
software code may be reusable. Even if the altered project were not 
similar, the expertise of the team working on the project would be 
useful on other projects. 
 In the same hypothetical situation, the U.S. firm adopting the 
Contracting Model may choose to terminate the contract. In such 
case, the U.S. firm is likely to be held liable for damages. 
Theoretically, the U.S. firm could renegotiate with the Indian 
contracting company in order to gain some of these post-
termination advantages seen for the FDI Model such as software 
code reuse and access to expertise. However, in reality, the U.S. 
firm will be in an unfavorable bargaining position because the 
Indian contracting company will have exclusive rights on the 
expertise created by the programmers from the first project and will 
be able to negotiate a higher price (relative to its costs) for this 
retained expertise. According to duration calculations, a new 
software team could take up to eighty percent more time on a 
follow-on software project than would the original team.35  
 In a world of perfect information, the Indian contracting 
company may be able to negotiate up to the value that the expertise 
would provide to the U.S. firm. Even in a world of imperfect 
information, the Indian contracting firm will be able to negotiate 
some of the value of the expertise created by the first project, 
thereby forcing the U.S. firm to repay for the expertise it originally 
paid the Indian contracting company to develop. Given the better 
 
 
 35 William Roetzheim, Estimating and Managing Project Scope for Maintenance 
and Reuse Projects, CROSSTALK, J. OF DEF. SOFTWARE ENG'G, Dec. 2004, at 9, 
available at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2004/12/0412Roetzheim.html.  
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potential to recoup losses, in terms of expertise and code reuse, 
market uncertainty may lead U.S. firms to favor the FDI Model 
over the Contracting Model. 
 
4. Legal uncertainty 
 
 The area of biggest environmental uncertainty in Williamson’s 
framework for the software industry is the legal uncertainty. An 
area of particular legal uncertainty in India is the protection of IP. 
The uncertainty surrounding IP in India should lead U.S. firms to 
adopt the FDI Model over the Contracting Model. In order for an 
Indian contract firm or a foreign subsidiary to function, the U.S. 
firm must transfer IP and expertise to the Indian development team. 
The expertise and IP comes in many forms. In some software 
projects, the U.S. firm may transfer to the Indian team knowledge 
of how internal software modules operate. In more complex 
software projects, such as revamping software systems, the U.S. 
firm transfers the entire code or portions of the code to the Indian 
team. With that code and experience working on it, the Indian team 
gains knowledge of the algorithms and its application. All of these 
things are IP in the broad sense. Some are trade secrets and some 
are patented or patentable. Particularly, the code will be protectable 
under copyright law. Some of this IP may constitute part of the 
U.S. firm’s significant competitive advantage.  
 Although under the Contracting Model, the IP and expertise 
transferred to the Indian contracting firm are protected to some 
extent by the contract agreement and the IP laws in India, 
uncertainty still remains, as noted above. Furthermore, some of the 
transferred expertise is not protectable under contract or IP law, 
such as the ability to use the U.S. firms’ internal software system 
modules. 
 Under the FDI Model, U.S. firms gain protection through 
employment law and workforce coherence in addition to IP law. 
For example, employment law allows U.S. firms to enter into non-
disclosure and other legal agreements with their employees, thereby 
increasing the number of legal devices at the firms’ disposal. 
Because the Contracting Model does not provide these additional 
legal protections, Huang predicts that U.S. firms are more likely to 
apply the FDI model if they transfer expertise.36  
 
 
 36 YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE 
REFORM ERA 51–52 (William Kirby ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).  
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 Workforce coherence, which is easier to attain under the FDI 
Model, will also cause U.S. software firms to favor the FDI Model 
over the Contracting Model. Workforce coherence is easier to 
maintain under the FDI Model because U.S. firms have direct 
control over the hiring and firing of India-based employees. By 
contrast, under the Contracting Model, U.S. firms maintain 
workforce coherence only if two conditions exists: (1) the U.S. firm 
uses the same Indian contracting company for subsequent projects, 
and (2) if the Indian company retains its employees and places the 
same employees on subsequent projects for the same U.S. firm. 
Furthermore, a U.S. firm has limited influence over which 
employees the Indian contracting company retains and less likely 
knows which employees of the Indian contracting company are 
important to retain. 
 Workforce coherence is important for several reasons. First, 
increased workforce coherence leads to a decrease in employee 
divulgence of expertise or other IP. Often expertise and other 
unprotectable IP are not valuable enough or recognizable enough 
for third party elicitation. If the employee leaves, however, the new 
employer might recognize and have access to the expertise or other 
unprotectable IP held by the employee. Therefore, workforce 
coherence makes it less likely for a competing firm or a third party 
to acquire the expertise. 
 Second, retained expertise can save costs. Consider, for 
example, a U.S. firm with experience in designing and building 
applications for cellular phones that does not have in-house 
development capacity to make a new solitaire card game for the 
phones. If the U.S. firm hires an Indian software contracting 
company to build the game, the firm would increase its return on 
investment by training the Indian team to develop software for 
cellular phones.  
 Under the Contracting Model, the only way that the U.S. firm 
can continue to benefit from the initial training investment is to 
continue to hire the same Indian software contracting company for 
future cellular phone software projects. Doing so, however, may 
bring about the situation where contracting becomes less 
desirable—the combination of the environmental factor of reduced 
numbers with the human factor of opportunism. The Indian 
company will be in a position to negotiate a higher price for the 
contracting work. It can negotiate the price up to the amount the 
U.S. firm would spend on a competing Indian company to perform 
the same task. In doing so, the Indian software contracting 
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company can fairly accurately estimate the competing company’s 
cost by calculating how much it would cost a different, non-expert 
team inside their own company to perform the task. The net result 
is that under the Contracting Model, the Indian company can 
capture part of the cost savings inherent in repeat-player expertise, 
thereby diminishing cost savings to the U.S. firm. In contrast, under 
the FDI Model the U.S. firm captures its entire cost savings 
associated with repeat-player expertise. 
 Third, workforce coherence is important because it enables U.S. 
firms to negotiate directly with particularly valuable employees. 
Consider the example of a U.S. firm developing software for 
telephones. If only one India-based employee can consistently and 
efficiently program the graphical display on the phones, she 
becomes particularly valuable to the U.S. firm. Under the FDI 
Model, if the employee attempted to leave, the U.S. firm might 
retain her by negotiating a raise up to the cost savings she provides 
on projects. By contrast, an Indian software contracting firm 
operating under the Contracting Model would have less incentive to 
retain the employee. Given the plenary nature of the software 
contracting industry, the Indian company will not utilize the 
employee’s specialized skills to the fullest as U.S. firms would 
under the FDI Model—causing a relative under-valuation of 
specialized skills. Therefore, compared to the U.S. company, the 
Indian company will have fewer surpluses with which to negotiate a 
higher salary and will be more likely let the employee go.37 
Trade secret law is also available to U.S. firms for protection of 
IP or expertise transferred to an Indian team under either the 
Contracting Model or the FDI Model. Trade secret law, often 
through the use of non-disclosure agreements or other contracts, 
can protect U.S. firms from theft of trade secrets by either 
employees or contractors, and therefore is applicable to both the 
Contracting Model and the FDI Model. However, the FDI Model 
provides a further protection for trade secret through increased 
workforce coherence. Since most of the cases in which trade secrets 
 
 
 37 This assumes that the Indian software contracting firm has fewer cellular 
phone software development projects than the U.S. firm. If the Indian firm were more 
specialized and had more telephone software jobs, it would have more incentive and 
available surplus to pay the specialized worker; however, this is not generally the case. 
Software contracting firms tend to perform a broader range of work than in-house 
software development teams. 
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are stolen are brought against former employees or contractors,38 
the FDI Model should expose U.S. firms to much less opportunity 
for theft of trade secrets. Furthermore, as noted above, employees 
with valuable knowledge are more likely to be retained under the 
FDI Model than the Contracting Model.   
 U.S. firms may have additional incentive to utilize the FDI 
Model over the Contracting Model when the Indian team creates 
expertise or IP. Consider an example similar to the one above: a 
U.S. firm wants to develop a solitaire game for cellular phones and 
has never done so before. By adopting the Contracting Model and 
hiring an Indian software contracting firm to develop the game, the 
U.S. firm will obtain the game at a lower cost than it would if it 
hired U.S.-based developers to produce the game. While the U.S. 
firm can negotiate patent rights before entering into a contractual 
agreement, absent such an agreement, the Indian firm will be the 
default owner of any protectable IP it develops and may seek 
additional rents with respect to the IP developed during the job. 
However, given the desire to obtain the contract with the U.S. firm 
and the uncertainty as to the protectability of and value of any IP 
developed, the Indian contracting firm may forego negotiating the 
rents with respect to developed IP.  
 Even if the Indian firm does not seek rents for IP that it 
develops under the Contracting Model, the U.S. firm may still be in 
an unfavorable negotiating position if non-patentable expertise is 
created by the Indian team—such as the ability to efficiently 
program graphics for cellular phones. In order to benefit from the 
expertise created by the Indian team, the U.S. firm must expose 
itself to Williamson’s reduced numbers dilemma. The Indian firm 
will have the ability to negotiate follow-on contracts at a higher 
price relative to its costs; costs are reduced due to the expertise 
gained during the first contract with the U.S. firm. Difficulty 
identifying the developed expertise places the U.S. firm at a further 
disadvantage. In the telephone software example, where 
programming graphics is particularly difficult, the Indian firm may 
not even know to tell the U.S. firm that they developed expertise in 
telephone graphics programming. Without first-hand knowledge, 
the U.S. firm cannot identify or value the created expertise, thereby 
incapable to negotiate for any of the cost savings created by the 
 
 
 38 Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 
1076, 1080 (1988). 
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expertise before the contract is signed, after the product is 
delivered, or upon negotiation of follow-on contracts. 
 On the other hand, under the FDI model, a U.S. firm can better 
benefit from and protect the expertise and IP created by the Indian 
team through increased workforce retention in a way similar to how 
it protects transferred expertise and IP. Given the closer 
relationship between the Indian team and the U.S. firm under the 
FDI Model, the U.S. firm is more likely to discover the IP or 
expertise created by the Indian team and better position itself to 
retain particularly valuable employees. 
 In sum, although expropriation and exchange-rate risks do not 
weigh in favor of either the Contracting Model or the FDI Model, 
market and legal uncertainty factors, weigh in favor of U.S. firms 
choosing the FDI Model. Therefore, the theories put forth by 
Williamson and Huang predict that most U.S. software firms will 




 Wells theorizes that a U.S. firm will follow the FDI Model in 
India only when the U.S. firm has an advantage over Indian 
competitors and when it has a reason to internalize that advantage.39 
Because U.S. firms have greater access to the more lucrative 
Western customer markets, U.S. software firms have a market 
advantage over potential Indian competitors, which may want to 
utilize the same low-cost Indian IT labor. Although India’s 
domestic software market is growing, it is still just a fraction of the 
size of the U.S. and European software markets.40  
 Access to and understanding of the lucrative U.S. software 
market is important for a software development firm to successfully 
produce viable software products. Understanding of the U.S. 
software market comes from a variety of sources: potential 
customers, who describe needs during customer meetings; 
investors, who often look to fulfill particular needs for other 
 
 
 39 Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mobile Exporters: New Foreign Investors in East Asia, in 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 182 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1993).  
 40 In 2004, the Indian domestic IT market was just under US$600 millions while 
India’s IT market grew to US$21.9 billion in the United States. Indian’s IT Market 
Grows to US$21.9 Billion in 2004, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 16, 2005. The U.S. domestic 
software market was estimated at US$70 billion. THE SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. 
ASS’N, PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REVENUE AND GROWTH, available at 
http://www.siia.net/software/pubs/growth_software05.pdf.  
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companies in which they invest; strategic partners, who often look 
to fill needs in their organization; and employees who come from 
other companies and have an understanding of the needs of those 
companies and their customers. Taken together, the network of 
customers, employees, and employers provides an understanding of 
the software market that is difficult to replicate. 
 The market advantage provides U.S. firms with the ability to 
produce valuable software innovations. After determining market 
demands, U.S. firms can design and develop software products to 
meet those demands. The process of creating innovative products 
will lead to market risk, creation of IP and expertise, and transfer of 
IP and expertise among software development teams for the reasons 
discussed above. Consider the example of a U.S. software firm that 
has developed numerous software applications for cellular phones. 
If the U.S. firm finds a customer demand for a solitaire card game 
(the firm’s market advantage) and decides to utilize an Indian 
software team for its development, it will transfer expertise or IP to 
the Indian team under either the FDI Model or the Contracting 
Model. On the other hand, if the U.S. software firm has never 
developed software for cellular phones, the U.S. firm’s India-based 
software team will create the needed expertise. Regardless of 
whether the expertise or IP is transferred by the U.S. firm or 
created by the Indian team, the U.S. firm should internalize the 
market advantage using the FDI Model rather than the Contracting 
Model for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, under Well’s 
theories, the U.S. firm will choose the FDI over the Contracting 
because it has a market advantage over potential Indian software 
competitors, and it has reasons to internalize that advantage.  
 
IV. INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN INDIA 
 
A. Investments are not Following the Patterns 
Predicted by the FDI Theories 
 
 As predicted by Williamson, Wells, and Huang, many U.S. 
firms adopted the FDI Model. For example, Agile (an enterprise 
software company), SAP (a collaborative business solution 
company), and Intel (a leading computer chip manufacturer) have 
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all opened IT development centers in India.41 However, there are 
also a number of firms hiring Indian contracting companies to 
capitalize on the low-cost and well-trained Indian IT workers.42 
Although it is difficult to tell what percentage of companies use 
Indian software contracting firms as opposed to engaging in the 
FDI, empirical evidence suggests that companies utilize the 
Contracting despite the predicted benefits of the FDI.   
 In their work on New Institutionalism, DiMaggio and Powell 
explain that a few U.S. firms may have adopted the Contracting 
Model over the FDI for rational reasons and that other U.S. firms 
may have simply followed even when doing so was less efficient.43 
However, as noted in Powell’s critical analysis of his previous 
work, sub-optimal practices may arise from a complex 
accommodation of internal and external forces as well as from 
differences among industries.44   
 To better understand why U.S. software firms are choosing the 
the Contracting over the FDI, the author interviewed two vice 
presidents (VPs) of Indian software contracting firms who have 
experience with U.S. firms that opt the Contracting over the FDI. 
The following section draws freely, without citation, from the 
information obtained from the two interviews. 
 B.D. Goel is VP of solutions at Aztec Software and is 
responsible for Aztec’s creation of client software solutions and for 
Aztec’s IP service capabilities. Aztec is an Indian software 
contracting firm with offices in Silicon Valley and London as well 
as a development center in Bangalore, India. Over ninety percent of 
Aztec’s 1,500 employees work in the Bangalore development 
center. Aztec provides clients with a broad range of software 
systems: from small projects, such as software installation 
 
 
 41 Bruce Richardson, Highlights From Agile Software and Agility, AMR 
RESEARCH, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.agile.com/news/2005/amr_030205.pdf; 
Innovative India; Research and Development, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 2004, at 65. 
 42 Approximately thirty percent of the IT companies surveyed in the 2004 
ITtoolbox survey outsource to foreign contract agencies. Of those, seventy-four 
percent outsourced to India. ITTOOLBOX, supra note 24. 
 43 Paul. J. DiMaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 65 (Paul. J. DiMaggio & Walter 
Powell eds., 1991). 
 44 Walter Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 194–96 (Paul. J. DiMaggio & 
Walter Powell eds., 1991). 
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programs, to large projects, such as customer support management 
(CSM) software suites.   
 Dr. Shafy Eltoukhy is VP of manufacturing operations at Open 
Silicon. Open Silicon, an Indian software contracting firm with 
offices in Silicon Valley and Bangalore, provides computer chip 
design services. Both offices house software development teams. 
Although Open Silicon is not a traditional software company, its 
interaction with customers is software-based and its business shares 
many similarities with traditional software contracting firms.45   
 Aztec and Open Silicon operate with similar project models. In 
both companies, a U.S.-based management team provides project 
leadership and daily software design management while India-
based developers (and occasionally U.S.-based developers in Open 
Silicon’s case) provide the work product. The U.S.-based 
management acts as the primary interface between the U.S.-based 
customer and the India-based development team.46   
 
B. Contracting Companies are Providing a Hybrid Model 
 
 To understand why U.S. firms are not adopting the FDI Model 
with the expected frequency, one must look to the structure of 
Indian software contracting companies like Aztec and Open 
Silicon. These Indian contracting firms internalize some of the FDI 
structure to provide U.S. firms with a hybrid of the FDI and the 
Contracting Models in the following manners.  
 
 
 45 Open Silicon’s clients provide the company with software code that describes 
the desired functionality of the client’s chip. Open Silicon utilizes software-based 
computer chip simulators to incorporate other functions that the clients may desire and 
to examine the overall chip design. For example, a client may come to Open Silicon 
with a design for a new mobile central processing unit (CPU) for a personal data 
assistant (PDA). The client provides Open Silicon with a software program that 
defines the functionality of the CPU. Open Silicon incorporates other functionality 
needed to complete the PDA design in the software design, for example off-the-shelf 
display processor and memory chips. Open Silicon will then design the “layout” for 
the chip and test the completed PDA board to ensure that the integration of the various 
components works properly. When completed, Open Silicon provides the completed 
design as software to the client, and the client will send the design to a computer chip 
fabrication facility to create and test the physical chip. 
 46 Open Silicon also provides some customers the option of U.S.-based 
development teams. However, even in this case, the U.S.-based client rarely interacts 
with the U.S.-based development team. All communication is handled by the U.S.-
based management teams. 
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 First, software contracting companies like Open Silicon and 
Aztec provide U.S. firms with U.S.-based corporations with which 
to negotiate. Aztec has sales, marketing, and management teams in 
the U.S. while Open Silicon has the majority teams of the company 
in the U.S., including software development teams. Though the 
mere existence of a U.S. corporation on paper is unlikely to 
improve the relations of U.S. firms and foreign contracting firms, it 
is likely that the extent of the U.S. presence that the Indian 
contracting firms provide does improve its relations with its U.S. 
customers. The extent of onshore presence combined with the legal 
structure provides potential U.S. customers with a familiar 
accountability structure, which improves their comfort in utilizing 
an India-based development team. 
 Second, the hybrid contracting firms have substantial on-shore 
assets. The software industry is human-capital intensive. Therefore, 
unlike other traditional outsourcing industries such as 
manufacturing industry where companies have expensive fixed 
assets like factories and machinery overseas, the fixed assets 
maintained overseas in the software industry (computers, licenses, 
etc.) are similar to the assets maintained in the U.S. for use by the 
U.S.-based management teams (at least on a per-employee basis). 
Therefore, a U.S. firm can tap into the lower-cost Indian IT labor 
while maintaining a substantial portion of their total assets in the 
U.S. Moreover, many of the assets maintained by Indian software 
companies, and software companies in general, may be held as 
liquid assets or easily liquefiable assets, such as stocks and other 
securities. 
 Given that there are few fixed assets tied to the Indian 
development teams, Indian software contracting companies can 
provide the lower-cost Indian IT labor while maintaining a 
substantial portion of their total assets in the U.S. Therefore, Indian 
software contracting companies can provide substantial U.S. assets 
for attachment to contracts. For example, Aztec Software provides 
bonding for the services it offers in addition to the implied potential 
to attach to its U.S. assets if one of its clients brings a suit against 
it. 
 Third, Indian contracting companies like Aztec and Open 
Silicon partially counter potential problems with IP creation and IP 
transfer. The approaches to countering these IP-related 
disadvantages include “IP isolation.” Both Aztec and Open Silicon 
employ IP isolation techniques to 1) reduce the risk that one 
client’s IP may leak to another client and 2) reduce the risk of IP 
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theft. The first step in IP isolation is identifying which clients have 
potentially conflicting IP. A contracting firm accomplishes this 
identification by disclosing current client lists to new clients and 
investigating any potential conflicts that the client identifies. Once 
the Indian firm identifies a potential client conflict, the firm 
engages in IP isolation. 
 A contracting firm can perform IP isolation physically or 
ethically. A firm may physically isolate teams from one another if 
they work on projects with potential IP conflicts. The physical 
isolation may include placing competitive projects in separate 
buildings or floors. Where physical separation is infeasible, Indian 
contracting firms can create “ethical walls” between groups that 
work on potentially conflicting projects by informing groups of the 
conflicts and directing workers not to discuss those projects. Both 
the ethical walls and physical separation reduce not only the risk of 
inadvertent leakage of IP from one client’s project to another’s but 
also the risk of IP theft by curtailing the number of workers with 
access to a particular client’s IP.47 For example, Aztec Software has 
two clients that are direct competitors with one another, Metreo and 
Vendavo, both of whom develop price management software. Since 
Aztec identified the conflict, the firm can maintain an ethical wall 
between the projects by ensuring that employees are not cross-
assigned between competitive projects, instructing the teams to 
avoid communicating about the projects with others working on 
competitive projects, and physically separating infrastructure and 
personnel as appropriate. 
 Indian contracting firms also encourage their clients to protect 
their IP by determining what is “strategic” to their business and 
what is merely “necessary” to the completion of a project. Mr. Goel 
noted that “getting a software installation program to work 
correctly is necessary for product roll-out, but it is not strategically 
important. The merely ‘necessary’ development is the kind of work 
we want from our clients.” He also noted that only a small 
percentage of the software and IP created for any particular system 
is strategic to the competitive advantage of the company. The rest 
of the software and IP are necessary but do not provide the client 
with competitive advantage. If U.S. software companies can 
 
 
 47 Indian contracting companies also provide IP isolation over time. Aztec, for 
example, provides clients with a two-year non-compete agreement, which states that 
Aztec employees who have worked on a client’s project must wait two years before 
working on any competitive project. 
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successfully separate the strategic IP from the necessary IP and hire 
the Indian contracting firms to work only on what is necessary, they 
can reduce the potential damage due to theft or leakage of IP.   
 Dr. Eltoukhy noted a similar strategy used by Open Silicon. 
Open Silicon’s clients can provide their IP (their chip functionality) 
in two ways: 1) as computer code representing the actual “logical 
structure” of their chip or 2) as “black box” computer code 
describing the size, connections, and functionality of the chip but 
hiding the logic used in the chip. The code describing the logical 
structure exposes the client’s IP more than the black box code does. 
Open Silicon can supplement either type of code with additional 
functionality to design the chip that the client desires. If the client 
provides logical structure, Open Silicon can better modify the chip 
layout to optimize chip size or improve power usage. By providing 
a black box code, Open Silicon will have less flexibility in 
optimizing the chip design but will be able to design the completed 
chip without having access to the strategic IP related to the client’s 
chip design. Therefore, Open Silicon’s clients can provide strategic 
IP in black box form and avoid potential loss of strategic IP, 
although they lose optimization. 
 It may be difficult for a U.S. software firm to determine what 
constitutes the firm’s strategic IP. The U.S. firm will know how it 
differentiates itself from competitors, but the IP related to that 
differentiation may not be the company’s strategic IP. For example, 
the U.S. firm developing games for a cellular phone may feel that it 
differentiates itself from its competitors by providing more exciting 
games. However, the company’s strategic IP may not be related to 
game play in particular but, instead, may be an algorithm for 
efficiently displaying graphics on the cellular phone. If the U.S. 
firm successfully identifies and avoids outsourcing strategic IP, 
then the firm will have more actual IP protection. 
 Dr. Eltoukhy also noted that reputation for IP protection is of 
high importance in U.S. companies’ choosing among the Indian 
contracting companies. Indian contracting firms must demonstrate 
not only that they can efficiently create the software required by the 
clients, but also that they can protect their clients’ IP. Since 
information on the Indian contracting firms is widely available, any 
failure to protect a client’s IP may be litigated and publicized, and 
U.S. software firms have the knowledge they need to identify 
reliable Indian contracting firms. If an Indian firm acquires a bad 
reputation for IP protection, it will lose most or all of its business. 
By contrast, the Indian firms with good reputations will keep 
SPRING 2006 Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
305 
thriving. Therefore, market forces will lead to the survival of Indian 
firms that protect IP well and the demise of those that do not. 
 Perhaps the Indian contracting firms described here as “hybrid” 
could be considered variations on the contracting firms traditionally 
considered under the Contracting Model. However, the fact that 
these firms have substantial U.S. presence, tend to have significant 
attachable U.S. assets, and are structured to provide some of the 
advantages of the FDI Model seems to warrant a discussion of them 
separate from the foreign contractors typically considered under the 
Contracting Model. 
 
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Hybrid Model 
 
1. Advantages of the hybrid model 
 
 The Hybrid Model combines some of the advantages of the 
Contracting and the FDI. The Hybrid Model reduces exposure to 
Williamson’s dilemma of bounded rationality combined with 
environmental uncertainty by avoiding some of the legal 
uncertainty associated with the Contracting Model. Under Hybrid 
Model, the two parties to the contract are the U.S. firm and the U.S. 
branch of the Indian contracting agency, which are both 
incorporated and maintain substantial assets in the United States. 
Therefore, contract disputes or other litigation will be likely 
governed by U.S. law, adjudicated by U.S. courts, and have 
judgments rendered against U.S. assets. Because U.S. law and 
subsequent judgments are more familiar and may be, or at least 
appear to be, more predictable than international arbitration or 
adjudication in Indian courts, U.S. firms may be more comfortable 
with Indian contracting companies that provide the Hybrid Model. 
Furthermore, the Hybrid Model can reduce the legal uncertainty 
associated with transfer and creation of IP, primarily through IP 
isolation and client retention of strategic IP.  
 In addition, the Hybrid Model allows U.S. firms not only to 
avoid any marginally higher costs associated with setting up an 
Indian subsidiary under the FDI Model,48 but also to engage in 
 
 
 48 It takes approximately seventy-one days to set up a business in India and costs 
an average of US$383. Additionally, a U.S. firm adopting the FDI Model must 
consider the cost and difficulty associated with the termination of employees in India 
where firing costs amount to approximately seventy-nine weeks of the employee’s   
wages. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS: ECONOMY SNAPSHOT—India, 
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short-term expansion of its development team. If Mr. Goel’s 
description is representative, U.S. firms develop strategic IP for 
particular products in-house and rapidly expand their software 
development capabilities using Indian contracting firms. Under 
such scheme, the Indian contracting firms swiftly create the 
software and IP necessary to bring the products to market. As the 
need for the expanded development team declines, U.S. firms can 
scale back the involvement of the Indian contracting firm. In the 
FDI Model, as in any model where employees are hired, such 
expansion and reduction of development teams is difficult.  
 U.S. software firms adopting the FDI Model may opt to hire a 
smaller team of Indian employees to complete the software 
development, thereby increasing the time to complete the software 
project. The smaller teams and longer tasks result in a more stable 
need for the employees’ services under the FDI Model. In contrast, 
the Hybrid Model, like the Contracting Model, results in an 
opportunity for the U.S. firm to utilize as large a development team 
as is efficient to work on a particular software project, thereby 
creating the product in a shorter time than can be achieved by a 
smaller development team hired under the FDI Model. 
 
2. Disadvantages of the hybrid model 
 
 The Hybrid Model has some disadvantages, mostly associated 
with the Contracting Model. First, although the risk of IP theft and 
IP leakage under the Hybrid Model is lower than that under the 
Contracting Model, the Hybrid Model does not eliminate the risk. 
The FDI Model will better protect IP transferred to the Indian 
development team due to improved workforce retention and the 
additional legal protection of employment law. However, as noted 
above, the U.S. firm may greatly reduce the potential damage 
caused by IP theft or leakage by sending only necessary IP to the 
Indian contracting company. 
 Second, the Hybrid Model, like the Contracting Model, has the 
disadvantage of loss of expertise. In the FDI Model, the U.S. firm 
retains employees and, therefore, retains the expertise gained by 
working on its projects. In both the Hybrid and the Contracting, 
                                                                                                          
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/Default.aspx?economyid=89 (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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employees of the Indian contracting company gain that expertise 
while working on client projects.  
 Finally, where a U.S. firm utilizes the same Indian contracting 
company in multiple, related software projects, the Indian company 
will be in a position to negotiate for a portion of the savings 
associated with the retained expertise, thereby reducing some of the 
benefit to the U.S. firm of using the same Indian contracting firm. 
However, the Hybrid and the Contracting have some advantage 
over the FDI Model in that the U.S. firm will have access to the 
aggregate expertise built up during the Indian contracting 
company’s work with other clients. 
 
D. The Hybrid Model and the Software Industry 
 
 The Hybrid Model is particularly compatible with the software 
industry for two reasons. First, the Hybrid Model functions well in 
the software industry due to its higher proportions of liquid assets 
available for attachment to contracts and U.S. litigation. In an 
industry requiring many fixed assets, a contracting firm will not be 
able to shift as substantial a portion of its total assets to the U.S. 
For example, in the manufacturing industry, where project costs 
such as machinery and manufacturing facilities are physically tied 
to a foreign country with inexpensive labor, the foreign-based 
assets will be difficult to use as collateral or attach in a U.S. legal 
action. By contrast, the software industry does not face the same 
problem because a large portion of corporate assets consists of 
moveable, liquid assets. 
 Second, contracting is practicable for software development 
because it is location-agnostic. Indian software contracting 
companies can send the products they built to their clients at the 
speed of light and at marginal cost. Geographically distributed 
software development teams can work from anywhere in the world 
on software systems, even systems tied to particular hardware 
servers in particular locations. Additionally, because lower-cost 
Indian software developers are not tied to fixed assets in India, they 
can go to the U.S. client’s site if needed. This is in sharp contrast to 
traditional, non-digital outsourcing, where manufacturers have to 
ship products among geographically disparate locations, and 
transportation of the inexpensive labor would be impossible 
because the labor force must have access to fixed assets such as 
machinery. The location-agnostic nature of software development 
overcomes the multi-site coordination problems normally inherent 
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in establishment of new contract-based projects in India, thereby 
improving the viability of contracting in the software industry. 
 
E. The Future of Outsourcing in India 
 
 With the increasing strength of IP protection in India, U.S. 
software companies should be less likely to adopt the FDI Model 
and more likely to adopt the Hybrid Model or the Contracting 
Model. As India toughens its IP laws, U.S. firms will have more 
confidence in Indian contracting companies. Given the discussion 
above, this trend may result in greater use of the Hybrid Model. If, 
however, U.S. firms regard Indian IP laws as sufficient to protect 
their interests, even against Indian contracting firms with no 
substantial U.S. assets, the Contracting Model may prevail over the 
Hybrid Model.  
 The primary reason for favoring the Contracting Model would 
be that India-only contracting companies should have lower 
overhead. Indian software contracting companies under the Hybrid 
Model will be inefficient relative to their India-only counterparts 
because of the resources expended in U.S. sales, marketing, and 
management. On the other hand, it is conceivable that, in order to 
compete with the Hybrid Model firms, the India-only firms would 
have to maintain a similarly substantial presence in the U.S., 




 This paper explores an expansion of the theories of foreign 
direct investment and contracting in the Indian software 
outsourcing industry, showing how a new breed of Indian software 
contracting companies adopting the Hybrid Model are approaching 
the opportunities in that industry. However, much more work is 
needed. First, understanding differences in the investment patterns 
among large, medium, and small U.S. firms outsourcing software 
projects to India49 may illuminate more about what drives U.S. 
firms to engage in the FDI versus the contracting as well as 
traditional contracting versus the Hybrid Model. In addition, an 
examination of various outsourcing patterns among various types of 
 
 
 49 Large companies of over 1,000 employees are two to three times more likely 
than their smaller counterparts are to outsource foreign contracting companies. NAT’L 
SCI. FOUND., supra note 22. 
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IT functions such as software development, maintenance, testing, 
and technical support may provide insight into how U.S. firms 
make decisions in entrusting software-related projects to foreign 
entities. 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 2 
 
310 
 
